Economic models and calibration

To predict the effect of a merger, we need to know where sales go when a price changes and how firms take those sales into account. Prices and shares alone rarely answer either question. antitrust combines observed market information with a demand system and an assumption about firm behavior to recover the parameters needed for a simulation.

The answer is conditional on those inputs and assumptions. A different margin, diversion estimate, or conduct model can change recovered demand and costs, and therefore the predicted effect. Calibration does not provide sampling standard errors; checking plausible inputs and model choices is part of an economic analysis. The workflow vignette (source) shows how to use a fitted market. Read it first for an executable example; here we explain what its fit means. The architecture guide (source) is for extension authors.

From observed market to structural state

Most calibrations start with product prices \(p\), quantities or shares \(q\), pre-change ownership \(\Omega\), and at least some gross margins \(m_i=(p_i-c_i)/p_i\). A model may also require diversion ratios, elasticities, capacities, bargaining powers, nest assignments, or auction moments. Check what a “share” means before supplying one: Logit uses quantity shares, while CES and AIDS use revenue shares. Utilities and valuations may also need an observed outside share or a normalization to fix their common level.

Consider Bertrand pricing. Firm \(f\) chooses the prices of its products to maximize \(\sum_{j\in J_f}(p_j-c_j)q_j(p)\). For one of those products, \(i\), the first-order condition is

\[ q_i(p)+\sum_{j\in J_f}(p_j-c_j)\frac{\partial q_j(p)}{\partial p_i}=0. \]

The first term is the gain from charging a slightly higher price on units of \(i\) still sold. The sum captures lost sales of \(i\) and any change in profits on the firm’s other products. A merger adds terms to that sum: sales diverted from one merging product to another now matter to the same owner. Partial ownership is handled with ownership weights.

Observed shares and margins restrict the demand derivatives in this condition. The chosen demand system fills in the remaining structure and allows marginal costs to be recovered. A common parameter can leave discrepancies between supplied and implied margins, as the workflow example shows. These moment discrepancies are distinct from equilibrium solver error. A counterfactual then changes ownership or another market condition while holding the calibrated demand primitives fixed. Two demand systems can agree at the observed prices but predict different outcomes if their derivatives change differently away from that point.

One useful observation about substitution is quantity diversion from \(i\) to \(j\): \(D^q_{ij}=-(\partial q_j/\partial p_i)/(\partial q_i/\partial p_i)\). It can help identify derivatives that shares and margins leave undetermined. Under the package’s diversion-matrix convention, the diagonal is \(-1\). With an outside option, the other modeled products need not absorb all sales lost by \(i\). See ?diversion for each model’s quantity or revenue convention.

Demand systems

Demand assumptions determine both who substitutes for whom and how those substitution patterns change as prices move. Linear and Log-linear models put restrictions directly on slopes or elasticities. Logit and CES give substitution a more structured form, while nests and random coefficients allow more variation. The table gives the main calibration tradeoffs; the model help pages give exact arguments and solver controls.

Family Substitution and recovered parameters What the calibration needs or restricts
Linear \(q=a+Bp\) has constant slopes in quantity levels. Calibration recovers intercepts and a slope matrix. Prices, quantities, margins, and diversion or symmetry restrictions are needed to pin down slopes. There is no curvature in quantity levels.
Log-linear (LogLin) \(\log q_i=a_i+\sum_j B_{ij}\log p_j\) has constant elasticities, collected in \(B\). Prices, quantities, margins, and diversion or other restrictions identify the elasticities.
LA-AIDS (AIDS) Budget shares respond to log prices and an expenditure/price index. Adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry restrict cross-price effects. Revenue shares, margins, and diversion or curvature restrictions identify the local system. Prices can be optional at calibration but matter for level outputs.
PCAIDS and nested PCAIDS Share proportionality restricts substitution; nests allow stronger within-group substitution. knownElast and mktElast provide identifying information. Nested calibration also needs nests and enough margins.
Logit \(s_i=\exp(\delta_i+\alpha p_i)/(1+\sum_j\exp(\delta_j+\alpha p_j))\). A common \(\alpha<0\) governs price response; substitution is proportional to shares. Prices, quantity shares, ownership, and enough margins identify \(\alpha\) and mean values. Without an outside option, one mean value is normalized.
Nested Logit Correlation within nests directs more diversion toward products in the same nest. Nest assignments and additional margins identify nesting parameters. A singleton nest cannot identify its own parameter.
CES Quality weights and price powers determine revenue shares. gamma controls substitution; alpha and the inside share govern expenditure allocation. Prices, revenue shares, margins, and an outside share or normalization identify primitives for the chosen construction. Ordinary output-market translations require gamma > 1.
Nested CES Substitution can differ within and across nests. Nest assignments and extra restrictions or margins identify the curvatures. In ordinary output markets, within-nest sigma exceeds between-nest gamma > 1.
BLP/random coefficients Integrating heterogeneous price tastes over consumer draws allows flexible diversion. Prices, shares, known outside share s0, and conduct-specific margins identify price-taste parameters by contraction and margin matching. Calibration does not estimate s0 or bargaining power.
Capacity Logit (LogitCap) Logit demand is subject to product quantity ceilings. Market size and capacities locate binding constraints. Margins at exactly binding products matter because unconstrained FOCs do not identify their costs.

In Linear, Log-linear, and AIDS models, restrictions on derivatives and diversion help fill gaps in observed market data (Haefen 2002; LaFrance 2004; Epstein and Rubinfeld 2004). Logit, CES, and capacity models instead put more structure on substitution or supply constraints (Werden and Froeb 1994; Sheu 2011; Froeb et al. 2003).

Some models have an "alm" variant for an unobserved outside share. It uses additional margins to identify that share along with demand curvature. The variant is a separate implemented model, even when its demand name is the same, and it may lack a specify() route.

Identification in observed synthetic markets

Observed synthetic experiments start from known costs, shares, ownership and one reference margin, then solve prices. That anchor does not identify every model: nests, relative slopes, capacities or bargaining state can require additional inputs. See ?synthetic_market for the supported inversions and ?supportedModels for the observed_synthetic capability. This is a different experiment from calibration using observed prices.

Conduct and cost recovery

Demand tells us how buyers respond to prices; conduct tells us which choices firms make and which profits they internalize. The distinction matters for cost recovery as well as merger predictions. A Bertrand margin, for example, cannot simply be fed into a Cournot first-order condition. Each conduct model below uses its own equilibrium argument.

Conduct How firms compete and what a merger changes What calibration requires
Bertrand Firms choose prices and internalize the margins on their own products. Common ownership adds recaptured sales to that calculation. Margins help identify demand derivatives; fitted prices and margins yield costs.
Cournot Firms or plants choose quantities, taking account of their effect on inverse demand. Common ownership changes those quantity incentives. General Linear/LogLin implementations use plant quantities and production or cost information. Logit and CES Cournot have separate complete implementations.
Stackelberg Quantity leaders move before followers, whose responses they anticipate. A merger or a capacity/leadership change may alter that sequence. Implemented Linear/LogLin games require plant and leadership information.
Monopolistic competition (moncom) Each product is priced against its perceived own demand. CES holds the aggregate index fixed for that derivative. Prices, shares, and at least one margin identify supported Logit/CES/BLP variants. Ownership does not enter the cross-product FOC.
Differentiated second-score auction A seller offers the portfolio product with the highest surplus and bids cost; payment reflects the next-best score. A merger changes portfolio alternatives. Shares and margins recover offer-value and cost primitives. A valuation may need normalization; price data help separate value from cost under cost changes (Brannman and Froeb 2000; Miller 2014).
Nash bargaining Buyer and seller negotiate against disagreement payoffs. A merger changes recapture within the seller’s portfolio and the bargaining alternatives. Bargaining power is supplied. Supported Logit, CES, and BLP models use their own FOCs rather than Bertrand margins alone.
Second-score bargaining Bargaining occurs with a second-score auction disagreement option. The Logit and CES implementations each have their own demand, bargaining, and auction state.
Capacity-constrained second-price auction A buyer sets a reserve, while seller costs are drawn from a distribution; capacity changes the minimum-cost distribution. Capacities, prices/margins, and sometimes reserve or self-supply moments identify the cost distribution. More flexible distributions need more moments (Waehrer and Perry 2003).

Implemented combinations

The demand and conduct descriptions above are a guide to choosing assumptions, not a menu of components that can be paired at will. The table below shows four standard Logit/CES routes selected from supportedModels() when this vignette is built. It is an illustrative selection, not the complete registry. Each row is a complete implemented model. TRUE means the listed lifecycle operation is available; simulate() still checks whether a particular scenario field is supported by that model.

demand conduct class calibrate specify simulate
logit bertrand Logit TRUE TRUE TRUE
logit cournot LogitCournot TRUE TRUE TRUE
ces bertrand CES TRUE TRUE TRUE
ces cournot CESCournot TRUE TRUE TRUE

Run antitrust::supportedModels() for the complete implementation list. The model registry identifies what can be fitted or simulated. A separate, narrower transition registry determines which fitted models can be translated with respecify(); an implemented row does not imply a transition from every other row. The workflow vignette (source) shows such comparisons, and the architecture vignette (source) explains the registry’s role in dispatch and extensions.

Brannman, Lance, and Luke M. Froeb. 2000. “Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2): 283–90. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465300558795.
Epstein, Roy J., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2004. “Merger Simulation with Brand-Level Margin Data: Extending PCAIDS with Nests.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy advances.4 (1): 2. https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0637.1212.
Froeb, Luke, Steven Tschantz, and Philip Crooke. 2003. “Bertrand Competition with Capacity Constraints: Mergers Among Parking Lots.” Journal of Econometrics 113 (1): 49–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(02)00166-5.
Haefen, Roger H. von. 2002. “A Complete Characterization of the Linear, Log-Linear, and Semi-Log Incomplete Demand System Models.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 27 (02). https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.31118.
LaFrance, Jeffrey T. 2004. “Integrability of the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System.” Economics Letters 84 (3): 297–303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.019.
Miller, Nathan H. 2014. “Modeling the Effects of Mergers in Procurement.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 37: 201–8.
Sheu, Gloria. 2011. “Price, Quality, and Variety: Measuring the Gains from Trade in Differentiated Products.” Unpublished manuscript.
Waehrer, Keith, and Martin K. Perry. 2003. “The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets.” The RAND Journal of Economics 34 (2): 287–304.
Werden, Gregory J, and Luke M Froeb. 1994. “The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 407–26. https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jleorg/v10y1994i2p407-26.html.