antitrust Reference Manual1 months ago
Introduction | Part 1: Unilateral Effects | The Bertrand Pricing Game | The Game | The Mathematical Model | Adding Exogenous Capacity Constraints | Calibrating Model Demand and Cost Parameters | Linear Demand | Log-Linear Demand | LA-AIDS Demand | Nested LA-AIDS | Logit Demand | Logit with Capacity Constraints | Nested Logit | (Nested) Logit With Unobserved Outside Share | CES Demand | Nested CES | Marginal Costs | Simulating Merger Effects | Summarizing Results | Plotting Results (experimental) | Simulating Price Effects with Efficiencies | Excluding Products From the Market (experimental) | Measuring Changes In Consumer Welfare | Defining Antitrust Markets | Simulating Merger Effects With Known Demand Parameters | Gotchas | Market Definition | The Cournot Quantity Game | The Game | Cournot with Logit Demand | Cournot with CES Demand | Simulating Price Effects With Marginal Cost Efficiencies | Simulating Price Effects With Capacity Constraints | Excluding Products or Plants | Allowing For First-Mover Advantage | Auction Models | 2nd Price Auction with Capacity Constraints | Calibrating Model Parameters | Selecting a Cost Distribution | Identifying Moments | Simulating Merger Effects (experimental) | Summarizing Results | Simulating Price Effects With Efficiencies | 2nd Score Auction with Differentiated Products | Merger analysis | Excluding Products From the Market | Measuring Changes In Consumer Welfare | Calibrating Unobserved Outside Share | 2nd Score Auction with CES Demand | The Nash Bargaining Game (experimental) | The Bargaining Game | Vertical Supply (experimental) | Other Tools | CMCR | Generalized Pricing Pressure | HHI | Part 2: Coordinated Effects | A Collusion Game with Bertrand Reversion as Punishment | The Incentive to Collude Under Grim Trigger | Comparing Incentives to Collude and Defect Under Grim Trigger (experimental) | Part 3: Under the Hood | Getting Help | Modifying and Extending antitrust | The Bertrand Model | The Auction Models | Appendix
