Tariffs when firms choose quantities

Quantity competition has two different data layouts in trade: differentiated products with Logit demand, and plants producing homogeneous products. This guide uses trade 0.9.0 with compatible antitrust/coordination dependencies and illustrative deterministic data. Prices are currency per unit and outputs are units. See the tariff starter (source) for net-revenue margins and CV signs.

Differentiated Logit products

Each product has its own demand and price. Firms choose their portfolio’s quantities. The Miller portfolio below contains two products.

library(trade)
products <- c("BUD", "OLD STYLE", "MILLER", "MILLER-LITE",
              "OTHER-LITE", "OTHER-REG")
owner <- c("BUD", "OLD STYLE", "MILLER", "MILLER", "OTHER-LITE", "OTHER-REG")
price <- c(.0441, .0328, .0409, .0396, .0387, .0497)
quantities <- c(.066, .172, .253, .187, .099, .223) * 100
margins <- c(.3830, .5515, .5421, .5557, .4453, .3769)
tariff <- c(0, 0, 0, 0, .1, .1)
fit <- logit_cournot_tariff(prices = price, quantities = quantities,
  margins = margins, owner = owner, tariffPost = tariff, labels = products)
product_results <- data.frame(product = products,
  price_pre = antitrust::calcPrices(fit, TRUE),
  price_post = antitrust::calcPrices(fit, FALSE),
  q_pre = antitrust::calcQuantities(fit, TRUE),
  q_post = antitrust::calcQuantities(fit, FALSE))
knitr::kable(product_results, digits = 4)
product price_pre price_post q_pre q_post
BUD BUD 0.0441 0.0441 6.6006 7.2350
OLD STYLE OLD STYLE 0.0328 0.0328 17.2013 18.8544
MILLER MILLER 0.0409 0.0409 25.2973 27.7284
MILLER-LITE MILLER-LITE 0.0396 0.0396 18.6986 20.4956
OTHER-LITE OTHER-LITE 0.0387 0.0402 9.9007 7.0954
OTHER-REG OTHER-REG 0.0497 0.0507 22.3014 18.5912

Compare OTHER-LITE’s quantity and price before/after with Miller’s portfolio. These columns are levels. The tariff .1 is 10% of consumer price, equivalent to a producer-value statutory rate .1/.9; it is not a statutory 10% rate. With quantities converted to shares summing to one, the default standard route uses an inside normalization product; it does not observe a positive outside share just because quantities were supplied.

calcDiagnostics(fit)
#>             Prices       Shares    Margins Market Elasticity
#> BUD              0  0.009784222 -139.99041                NA
#> OLD STYLE        0  0.007461340  -42.55424                NA
#> MILLER           0 -0.010597558   17.80326                NA
#> MILLER-LITE      0 -0.007459137   18.41930                NA
#> OTHER-LITE       0  0.007287209  -95.89199                NA
#> OTHER-REG        0  0.006389270  -21.57003                NA
fitted_margin <- antitrust::calcMargins(fit, preMerger = TRUE)
margin_fit <- data.frame(product = products, observed_margin = margins,
  fitted_margin = as.numeric(fitted_margin),
  relative_discrepancy_pct = 100 * (1 - margins / as.numeric(fitted_margin)))
knitr::kable(margin_fit, digits = 4)
product observed_margin fitted_margin relative_discrepancy_pct
BUD 0.3830 0.1596 -139.9904
OLD STYLE 0.5515 0.3869 -42.5542
MILLER 0.5421 0.6595 17.8033
MILLER-LITE 0.5557 0.6812 18.4193
OTHER-LITE 0.4453 0.2273 -95.8920
OTHER-REG 0.3769 0.3100 -21.5700

The diagnostic convention is 100 * (1 - observed/fitted), a relative calibration discrepancy, not a percentage-point margin difference. BUD’s observed margin is 0.3830, while its fitted margin is 0.15959; the reported discrepancy is approximately -139.99%, not a negative margin of that magnitude. These illustrative observations fit this Cournot specification poorly on margins, even though prices and quantities reproduce the baseline closely. Treat this as a calibration warning before drawing empirical conclusions. Diagnostics are not confidence intervals for the tariff effect.

An unobserved outside share

The ALM alternative uses additional aggregate elasticity information to estimate the outside share. This is a different calibration assumption, not a change of units or a mere solver setting.

alm <- logit_cournot_tariff(prices = price, quantities = quantities,
  margins = margins, owner = owner, mktElast = -1.5,
  calibration = "alm", tariffPost = tariff, labels = products)
knitr::kable(data.frame(product = products,
  standard_price = antitrust::calcPrices(fit, FALSE),
  alm_price = antitrust::calcPrices(alm, FALSE)), digits = 4)
product standard_price alm_price
BUD BUD 0.0441 0.0441
OLD STYLE OLD STYLE 0.0328 0.0328
MILLER MILLER 0.0409 0.0409
MILLER-LITE MILLER-LITE 0.0396 0.0396
OTHER-LITE OTHER-LITE 0.0402 0.0409
OTHER-REG OTHER-REG 0.0507 0.0526

The supplied market elasticity is negative. Differences between the two columns reflect different calibrated demand assumptions; they are not statistical uncertainty bands.

Plants producing one homogeneous product

All plants below sell the same product at a common price. A quantity matrix has one row per plant and one column per product. We construct baseline observations from linear inverse demand and quadratic plant costs, then impose a statutory 25% tariff on plant 1 using the consumer-price fraction .20.

n <- 5
capacity_parameter <- c(.4, .45, .5, .55, .6)
intercept <- 10
slope <- -.25
foc <- matrix(slope, n, n)
diag(foc) <- 2 * slope - 1 / capacity_parameter
q0 <- as.numeric(solve(foc, rep(-intercept, n)))
p0 <- intercept + slope * sum(q0)
mc0 <- q0 / capacity_parameter
margin0 <- 1 - mc0 / p0
plant_tariff <- matrix(c(.25 / 1.25, rep(0, n - 1)), ncol = 1)
plant <- cournot_tariff(prices = p0, quantities = matrix(q0, ncol = 1),
  margins = matrix(margin0, ncol = 1), owner = diag(n),
  tariffPre = matrix(0, n, 1), tariffPost = plant_tariff)
plant_q_pre <- antitrust::calcQuantities(plant, TRUE)
plant_q_post <- antitrust::calcQuantities(plant, FALSE)
knitr::kable(data.frame(plant = seq_len(n), q_pre = as.numeric(plant_q_pre),
  q_post = as.numeric(plant_q_post)), digits = 3)
plant q_pre q_post
1 2.339 1.927
2 2.602 2.631
3 2.859 2.890
4 3.111 3.145
5 3.356 3.393
c(price_pre = antitrust::calcPrices(plant, TRUE),
  price_post = antitrust::calcPrices(plant, FALSE))
#>  price_pre.P1 price_post.P1 
#>      6.433112      6.503546

capacity_parameter controls the curvature of cost (MC=q/capacity_parameter); it is not a hard capacity limit. Actual plant capacity constraints use the constructor’s capacitiesPre/capacitiesPost arguments. Compare the foreign plant’s response with the other four plants while remembering the product price is common to all plants.

Ownership and solver limits

Model Input layout Relevant constraint
logit_cournot_tariff() Product vectors Valid interior solution for active differentiated products
cournot_tariff() Plant × product matrices Nonnegative output and plant capacity complementarity

For commonly owned plants, marginal revenue includes the retained revenue from all owned output affected by a quantity change. Unequal tariffs within that portfolio require the corresponding product/plant retention weights. Ownership itself remains the actual ownership matrix. Do not add the policy wedge a second time as a physical cost shock or copy a universal ownership-row scaling recipe.

The homogeneous solver can handle output corners; differentiated mixed-retention support does not imply automatic selection of zero-output products. Exit must be specified through the supported route. Compare demand/cost specifications and input sensitivity when applying either model; a solved toy example does not establish the assumptions for an empirical market.

See ?logit_cournot_tariff, ?cournot_tariff, trade::supportedModels() and the mathematical reference. The reference separates retained-revenue equations from effective-cost shortcuts and preserves the longer demand and calibration background.